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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Respondent, Gordon Boyd ("Mr. Boyd") sought a petition for review before the
district court to determine whether I.C. $ 23-615 is unconstitutional and from the hearing
officer's decision finding that Mr. Boyd, through his employees, sewed an apparently
intoxicated person. ABC now appeals the decision of the district court that concluded
that I.C. $ 23-615 is unconstitutional on its face.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The Shot Glass, located in Orofino, Idaho, is the premises where Mr. Boyd is
licensed by ABC to serve beer and liquor by the drink. (R. p.51, Lodged Documents,
'Transmittal of the Record, Retail Alcohol Beverage License). On September 16,2006,
just shortly after midnight, at approximately 12:05 a.m., Idaho State Police ABC
investigators Gregory Harris ("Harris") and Timothy Davidson ("Davidson") cited Dawn
Molar, a bartender working at the Shot Glass, for violating I.C. $23-615, in that she
allegedly served an alcoholic beverage to Justin Anderson, an apparently intoxicated
person, while she was an employee of the Shot Glass. (R, pp 15-17,20). Then the
following evening before midnight, which was still September 16, 2006, at approximately
11:30 p.m., Idaho State Police ABC investigators Harris and Davidson witnessed an
apparently intoxicated person at the Shot Glass being sewed alcohol. (R. pp. 18-19). No
employee of the Shot Glass was cited at this time as the officers feared that any
confrontation might have compromised their safety. (R. p. 51, Lodged Documents, Tr. of
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Audio Proceedings, p. 45, L. 6-25, p. 46, p. 47).
On December 26, 2006, Administrative Complaints 06ABC-COM077 and
06ABC-COM078, were served upon Respondent that incorporated two Administrative
Violation Notices, dated October 12,2006, alleging that licensee, Mr. Boyd, dba Shot
Glass, by and through its employees, served alcohol to a person who was actually,
apparently or obviously intoxicated in violation of I.C. 5 23-615(2). (R. pp. 51, Lodged
Documents, Transmittal of the Record, Complaint for Suspension of Retail Alcohol
Beverage License 06ABC-COM077 and 06ABC-COM078).
On October 26,2007, Mr. Boyd moved to dismiss both Complaints on the
grounds that I.C. 5 23-615(2) is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite, and thus facially
invalid. (R. pp. 5 1,)
On November 15,2007, a hearing was held before the hearing officer. (R. p. 51,
Lodged Documents, Tr. of Audio Proceedings). The hearing officer denied Mr. Boyd's
motion to dismiss based on a hearing officer's lack of authority to rule on constitutional
issue, but heard the evidence on the two administrative violations. (R. pp. 5 1, Lodged
Documents, TI. of Audio Proceedings, p. 6, Ls 15-25, p. 7, p.8, Ls 1-14).
On December 4,2007, the hearing officer filed a Memorandum, Decision and
Preliminary Order deciding the two Complaints. (R. pp. 3-20). In his findings, the
hearing officer concluded that ABC had met its burden of proof in case number 06ABCCOM077, but did not meet its burden of proof in case number 06ABC-COM078. Mr.
Boyd did not seek agency review and the order became final by operation of law on
December 18,2007.
On January 2,2008, Mr. Boyd timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in the hearing officer's Memorandum
Decision and Order decision and moved to stay the suspension of the license as imposed
by the final order. (R. pp. 1-2). The district court granted the Motion to Stay. (R. pp.
24-25). On November 18,2008, oral argument was heard. On December 23,2008, a
Memorandum Decision and Order was issued finding that I.C. 5 23-615 was
unconstitutional on its face. (R. pp. 30-46). ABC timely appealed. (R. pp. 48-50).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The constitutionality of a statute or administrative regulation is a question of law over
which the Court exercises free review. There is a presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of the challenged statute or regulation, and the burden of establishing that
the statute or regulation is unconstitutional rests upon the challengers. An appellate court is
obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds it constitutionality. The judicial
power to declare legislative action unconstitutional should be exercised only in clear cases.
See, American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Resources, 143 Idaho

862, 869, 154 P.3d 433, 440 (2007).

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether the district court erred when it held that I.C. 8 23-615 is unconstitutional.

ARGUMENT

I. Idaho Code Section 23-615 Is Not Unconstitutionallv Overbroad
A.

Introduction

Mr. Boyd's argument to the district court challenged the constitutionality of I.C. 4
23-615 on the grounds that it is facially unconstitutional andlor unconstitutional as
APPELLATE'S BRIEF
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applied. The district court determined there is a protected property interest in operating a
business and I.C. 5 23-615 is overbroad because there is no objective standard by which
licensees or their employees can determine when a patron is apparently intoxicated.
B.

Standard of Review

An overbreadth doctrine is applicable only in areas of constitutionally protected
activity and may render void legislation which is lacking neither in clarity nor precision

Grayned v. City of Rocword, 408 U.S. 104,92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972);Cameron v. Johnson,
390 U.S. 611,88 S. Ct. 1335 (1968),reh'gdenied, 391 U.S. 971,88 S. Ct. 2029 (1968).
When presented with a facial overbreadth challenge, the Court must determine whether
the statute restricts a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. State v.

Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,714,69 P.3d 126, 133 (2003) (emphasis added). "The test may
be otherwise stated as whether the statute is unconstitutional in a substantial portion of
the cases to which it applies." Korsen at 134, citing, State v. Leferink, 133 Idaho 780,

785,992 P.2d 775, 780 (1999).
C.

I.C. 8 23-615

Idaho Code section 23-615 provides:
Restrictions on sale. No person licensed pursuant to title 23, Idaho Code,
or his or its employed agents, servants or bartenders shall sell, deliver or
give away, or cause or permit to be sold, delivered, or given away, or
allowed to be consumed, any alcohol beverage, including any distilled
spirits, beer or wine, to:

(1) Any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years, proof of which
shall be a validly issued state, district, territorial, possession, provincial,
national or other equivalent government driver's license, identification
card or military identification card bearing a photograph and date of birth,
or a valid passport.
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(2) Any person actually, apparently or obviously intoxicated.
(3) An habitual drunkard.
(4) An interdicted person.
Any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years, or other person, who
knowingly misrepresents his or her qualifications for the purpose of
entering licensed premises or for obtaining alcohol beverages from such
licensee shall be equally guilty with such licensee and shall, upon
conviction thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor.
D.

I.C. 6 23-615 Does Not Infringe on a Constitutional Protected Right

1.

The "faciallv overbroad" challenge to I.C. S 23-615 fails on its merits.

Mr. Boyd in this case cannot show how the result of application of the statute
upon a constitutionally protected right could be considered "substantial," as is required to
sustain his challenge that I.C. 3 23-615 is facially overbroad. A statute will not be
invalidated for overbreadth merely because it is possible to imagine some
unconstitutional applications. Members ofcity Council v. Taxpayers of Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 800, 104 S.Ct. 21 18,2126 (1984). This Court has stated that "rather, there
must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized
First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court." Korsen at 714. Therefore,
this Court has applied the requirement that any argued overbreadth must be "substantial"
before the statute will be held unconstitutional on its face. Id. If this court elects to give
the words "actually," "apparently," and "obviously" their plain meaning, Mr. Boyd has
failed to establish that the enforcement of the statute would unlawfully affect those
licensed to sell and serving alcohol legally in the least, let alone "significantly."
Idaho Code 3 23-615 should not be invalidated as overbroad because the conduct
it regulates is very specific to the over service of alcohol to those who are "actually,
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apparently or obviously intoxicated." I.C. 4 23-615. Additionally, the statute applies
only to people and premises licensed to serve alcohol. Only those licensed individuals
who choose to serve alcohol to clients who are "actually, apparently or obviously
intoxicated" risk enforcement action for their violation of the law. While it is
theoretically possible that a licensed person could be charged with overserving alcohol in
a case where the client was not intoxicated, this hypothetical situation is surely limited to
a small number of cases given the training, experience, technology, and observations
available to licensed servers of alcohol (and to law enforcement personnel). Overbreadth
is not substantial if, "despite some possibly impermissible application, the 'remainder of
the statute . . . covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally
proscribable . . . conduct.' " Sec 'y ofstate ofMaryland v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S.
947,964-65,104 S.Ct. 2839 (1984).
There is no significant danger that the lawful conduct of licensed alcohol servers
on licensed premises will be significantly compromised by enforcement of this statute.
Therefore, Mr. Boyd's facial challenge that I.C. 5 23-615 is overbroad must necessarily
fail.

2.

Mr. Boyd fails to demonstrate that the language of 1.C. 4 23-61 5 is vague.

A statute is void for vagueness if it (I) fails to define the criminal offense with
sufficient clarity to provide an ordinary person with notice of the prohibited conduct, or
(2) "fails to establish minimal guidelines to govem law enforcement" or others who must
enforce the statute. State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 585, 798 P.2d 43, 44 (1990). A statute is
not vague if it gives people a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited.

Id. Additionally, "[tlhe constitutional standards underlying the vagueness doctrine have
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never required that every word used in a criminal statute be statutorily defined." State v.

Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816,821, 10 P.3d 1285, 1290 (2000).
While an officer is required to make an arguably subjective determination that a
licensed server of alcohol did serve alcohol to a person "actually, apparently or obviously
intoxicated," the common meaning and understanding of the words of the statute save
I.C. 8 23-615 from being overly vague.
"Laws are enacted to be read and obeyed by the people and in order to reach a
reasonable and sensible construction thereof." Lewiston v 2 B. Mathewson, 78 Idaho
347, 354,303 P.2d 680,684 (1956). Thus, terms that are in common use among the
people at whom the statute is directed "shouId be given the same meaning in the statute
as they have among the great mass of the people who are expected to read, obey and
uphold them." Id. ABC is allowed to rely on the logical inference that people of
ordinary intelligence will be able to understand the use of common words in the English
language. Such words would include "actually," "apparently," "obviously" and
"intoxicated." Mr. Boyd here argues that there is no way for a bartender to know when a
patron is "actually intoxicated" except for a scientific test. However, that ignores the
other two descriptive words of the statute: "apparently and obviously." Officers Harris
and Davidson witnessed the patron in the Shot Glass's behavior and recognized the signs
of apparent intoxication. Through television, movies, and comedians, even non-drinkers
can recognize the signs of intoxication. The bartender in this case testified that she was
trained to recognize intoxicated persons. (R. pp. 5 1, Lodged Documents, Tr. of Audio
Proceedings, p. ll8,ll. 3-22).
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3.

Mr. Boyd fails to establish that I.C. 6 23-615 is subject to arbitrary and

discriminatory enforcement.
"A statute avoids problems with arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement "by
identifying a core of circumstances to which the statute or ordinance unquestionably
could be constitutionally applied." State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho, 195, 197,969 P.2d 244,
247, citing, State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho at 588, 798 P.2d at 47. I.C. 6 23-615 uses plain
words to describe the conduct proscribed. The words "actually," "apparently," and
"obviously," as they modify the word "intoxicated" in I.C. 5 23-61 5, do not render the
statute void for vagueness. A person's level of intoxication can be ascertained through
several various methods. Breath tests, blood tests and urine tests are all objective ways to
determine intoxication. Actual knowledge also prohibits one from serving a person he
knows to be intoxicated. That knowledge could be gleaned from observations of the
person's prior drinking, from the results of a BAC test, or from the person's admission of
intoxication to the bartender.
In the second situation, the server is expected to decline service to a person
"obviously intoxicated." Signs of obvious intoxication include the usual factors cited by
police officers in DUI investigations: slurred speech; bloodshot eyes; loss of balance;
vomiting. Finally, servers may not serve persons "apparently intoxicated." This category
includes those persons who appear, to all outward appearances, to be intoxicated, even if
they may not be. In this situation, if a person in the reasonable bartender's shoes had no
other information, and if ABC can show that the person should have appeared to be
apparently intoxicated to that reasonable bartender, then the statute prohibits service.
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The district court below found that attitudes vary according to community,
cultural and personal bias standards that make the phrase "apparently intoxicated"
subjective and therefore the statute is void because it leaves a community to speculate as
to what "apparently intoxicated" should mean. As cited above, however, this Court has
mled that a statute avoids problems of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by
identifying core circumstances to which the statute or ordinance unquestionably could be
constitutionally applied. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho, 195, 197,969 P.2d 244,247, citing
Bitt, 118 Idaho at 588,798 P.2d at 47.
This Court's task therefore is to evaluate I.C. 5 23-615 and identify a core set of
circumstances where application of the statute would be constitutional. ABC suggests to
the court that just such a "core set of circumstances where application of the statute
would be constitutional" can be identified here. In fact, the district court below found
that the hearing officer did not err in concluding that Anderson was served by the Shot
Glass bartender when he was obviously intoxicated. (R. pp. 34-37).
The use of several adverbs to modify the term "intoxicated" in I.C. 5 23-615
should lead this Court to find that a reader is on notice that anyone who is "actually,
apparently, or obviously intoxicated" should not be served alcohol. By including the
adverbs "actually," "apparently," and "obviously" in the language of LC. 3 23-615, the
Idaho Legislature has made such a task simple, especially given the facts in this case.
I.C. 3 23-615 is not a statute of universal application. It only applies to the
conduct of "person[s] licensed pursuant to Title 23, Idaho Code, or his or its employed
agents, servants, or bartenders . . ." I.C. Ej 23-615. Those individuals to whom this
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statute is directed should be able to identify when a person is actually, apparently, or
obviously intoxicated. Training is available for servers to develop such ability.
Since it is not in contention that the Legislature has broad power to define who
may and may not consume alcohol, as well as regulating when and where this
consumption can occur, there clearly exist circumstances in which I.C. 5 23-615 may be
constitutionally applied.
Idaho Code 5 23-615 provides sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. The statute at issue is unlilce the loitering ordinance struck
down as vague in State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho at 585, 798 P.2d at 44, which allowed police
unbridled discretion in determining whether the explanation offered by a loitering suspect
was sufficient to dispel the officer's alarm for the safety of persons or property. In fact,
pursuant to Idaho Code 5 23-615, the determination of whether a person is intoxicated
could be completed in a number of objective ways aside from an officer's testimony of
his own observations. These include eye-witness testimony and the use of breath tests,
urine tests, or blood tests to determine a person's actual level of intoxication.
In many instances when applying the requirements of other sections of the Idaho
Code, law enforcement officers are called upon to make a determination as to whether a
person is intoxicated, whether under the influence of alcohol or some other illegal
substance. Police officers receive training to determine a person's level of intoxication.
Law enforcement experience allows police officers to gain additional "on-the-job"
training in observing levels of intoxication. (The same experience is likewise available
through years of experience serving alcohol to customers who have consumed varying
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amounts of alcohol, such as the experience possessed by the bartender in this case. See
R. p. 51 lodged Documents, Tr. of Audio Proceedings, p, 117, Ls 13-25, p. 118, p. 124,
Ls 8-16, p. 138, Ls 8-24, p. 139, Ls 5-20, p. 141, Ls 19-25, p. 143, Ls 13-14). In court,
even a layperson may testify as to a person's level of intoxication, assuming a proper
foundation is laid for the layperson's knowledge.

E.

The Conduct proscribed by I.C. & 23-615 is not protected activih..

The overbreadth doctrine applies to statutes which, though designed to prohibit
legitimately regulated conduct, include within their prohibitions constitutionally
protected freedoms. State v. Leferink, 133 Idaho 780,785 (1999) citing, State v.

Richards, 127 Idaho 3 1 (Ct.App. 1995). The district court below mistakenly opines that
prohibiting the service of alcohol to "actually," "apparently" or "actually intoxicated"
persons will deprive a licensee of a protected property interest. (R. p. 38).
Unfortunately, the district court has confused the punishment from a violation of the
statute (suspension of the alcohol beverage license) with the prohibited conduct.
In this case there is no dispute that the state of Idaho may grant a license for the
sale of alcoholic beverages and that once issued ABC must grant due process before
suspending or revoking the license. Northern Frontiers, Inc. v. State ex rel. Cade, 129
Idaho 437,449,926 P.2d 213,215 (Ct. App. 1996. However, the district court below
erroneously finds that once licensed a business with an alcohol beverage license is
granted a non-existent constitutional privilege in the continued ability to sell alcoholic
beverages. (R. pp. 38-41). If the district court's reasoning is followed, then ABC could
never suspend or revoke an alcohol beverage license even after affording the
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licensee due process. Because the analysis of the district court is flawed, I.C. § 23-61 5
should not be determined to be overbroad.

Case law from other jurisdictions is instructive on the issues of overbreadth
and vagueness.

II.

While this is a case of first impression for the State of Idaho, Mr. Boyd's
challenge is not the first to this area of law. State v. Cotton, 686 S.W.2d 140, 142 (1985)
was decided in 1985 in Texas. In that case, Defendant was charged under the Alcohol
Beverage Control Act of Texas, the violation of which represented a criminal
misdemeanor. The case held:
[TJhere is a substantial and significant distinction between the criteria
"an intoxicated person" or a person "under the influence of alcohol ...
to the degree that he may endanger himself or another" and the criteria
"a person showing evidence of intoxication. The latter category
encircles and describes not only those who are so intoxicated that they
exhibit "outward signs" of that condition, but also those who are not
intoxicated, yet, nevertheless, exhibit one or more of the classic
symptoms of intoxication that are universally accepted as "evidence"
in criminal cases. Therein lies the problem.

State v. Cotton, 686 S.W.2d 140, 142 (1985).
As this Court can see, the Texas Court of Appeals found the phrase "a person
showing evidence of intoxication"

put bartenders in the position of guessing at

whether a person was showing evidence of intoxication and, therefore, the language was
vague. Id. at 143. The Court, however, stated that it likely would have upheld the statute
if the language had been akin to other Texas statutes which simply stated "an intoxicated
person." Id. at 142. Any attempt to link I.C. 5 23-615 to the unconstitutional Texas
statute carries little weight when the opinion of the Texas court is read in its entirety.
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The concurring opinion of Judge Teague in State v. Cotton is particularly
instructive. Judge Teague indicated that he wrote to give the Texas Legislature notice so
that this Texas statute can be drafted in such a way that it can be deemed constitutional.
Judge Teague wrote: "I believe that there is a world of difference in meaning between
the phrase 'showing evidence of intoxication' and the phrases 'obviously intoxicated'
'visibly intoxicated' or 'actually or apparently under the influence of liquor."' Id at 143.
Judge Teague goes on to say that "[wlithout question, to uphold such a statute as we have
here would permit an overzealous member of law enforcement to unlawfully invade the
privacy of some of our citizens. As to the other phrases, however, I find that facially they
are sufficiently clear to put one person on notice that another person has consumed one
too many beers." Id. It is clear that the Texas legislature read Judge Teague's opinion,
because the Texas statute prohibiting overservice of alcohol now reads:
This chapter does not affect the right of any person to bring a common
law cause of action against any individual whose consumption of an
alcoholic beverage allegedly resulted in causing the person bringing
the suit to suffer personal injury or property damage.(b) Providing,
selling, or serving an alcoholic beverage may be made the basis of a
statutory cause of action under this chapter and may be made the basis
of a revocation proceeding under Section 6.01(b) of this code upon
proof that: (1) at the time the provision occurred it was apparent to the
provider that the individual being sold, served, or provided with an
alcoholic beverage was obviously intoxicated (emphasis added) to the
extent that he presented a clear danger to himself and others; and (2)
the intoxication of the recipient of the alcoholic beverage was a
proximate cause of the damages suffered.
Texas State Alcohol Beverage Control Act, Title 2, Chapter 2. Further, ABC notes that
the Texas overservice misdemeanor code section, which reads "a person commits an
offense if the person with criminal negligence sells an alcoholic beverage to a habitual
drunkard or an intoxicated or insane person" was challenged in 1981 and survived its
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own constitutional challenge for vagueness. See Campos v. State, 623 S.W.2d 647 (Tex.
Ct. App., 1981).
A review of cases from around the United States show that many statutes use the
words "obviously" and "intoxicated" in enforcing the overservice laws. These states
include Idaho's regional neighbors California and Arizona. See, California Business and
Professions Code, Division 9, Chapter 16, Article 1, Section 25602; Arizona State Code,
Title 4, Article 3, Chapter 4-244. The Revised Code of Washington simply states "No
person shall sell any liquor to any person apparently under the influence of liquor."
R.C.W. 66-44-200. Clearly, this statute is similar to I.C. 5 23-615, which reads "actually,
apparently or obviously intoxicated."
Lastly, there is an Alaska Court of Appeals Decision from 1982, O'Donnell v.

Municipality ofAnchorage, 642 P.2d 835 (Alaska App., 1982). O'Donnell on appeal
argued that the statute, which stated "It is unlawful for any person to sell, furnish, give or
deliver any alcoholic liquor to anyone who is visibly intoxicated or who is under the age
of 19 years," was unconstitutionally vague as to the term "visibly intoxicated." Id. The
Court held "we also reject O'Donnell's assertion that the term "visibly intoxicated" as
used in AMC 8.05.010(A) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad." Id. at 837. In
sum, a review of similar statutes &om around the United States show that many states use
language similar to that of I.C. 5 23-615, and in every instance the similar language has
been upheld as constitutional.
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CONCLUSION
ABC respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's decision.
Dated this 26th day of May, 2009.
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